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Community (κοινωνία) is one of the most fundamental and distinctive concepts in Aristotle’s 
writings on human action; the political species of community (alongside spousal community, 
household community, and the community of friendship) is probably the most complicated 
iteration of the concept. Thus, scholars of Aristotle’s Politics (the primary audience of the volume 
under review) are much indebted to the publication of Riesbeck’s revised doctoral dissertation 
(University of Texas, Austin, 2012) that successfully and persuasively elucidates political 
community by showing both its likenesses and differences from the other forms of community 
Aristotle analyzes. The question that Riesbeck uses to explore these concepts in Aristotle’s 
writings: Is Aristotle’s praise for the constitution (πολιτεία) of kingship (which in places the 
Politics identifies as the ‘best constitution’ [(Pol. 3.17.1288a15-19, 28-29]) philosophically 
compatible with his theory of community and commonality? At first glance, the question seems to 
yield a negative answer due to what Riesbeck calls the ‘normative problem of monarchy’: the 
exclusionary nature of monarchy seems to result in a bad (i.e., unjust) community. But further, the 
question seems to yield a negative answer due to what Riesbeck calls the ‘conceptual problem of 
monarchy’: conceptually, kingship is a constitution that—at least in the extreme form that 
Aristotle’ focuses on—makes the decision-making of the monarchy absolute and thus presents 
kingship as constitution that is not itself a constitution. Taken together, the normative and 
conceptual problems of monarchy have led readers of the Politics to think that Aristotle’s account 
of kingship is an errant appendix at best, perhaps 4th century BCE Macedonian propaganda at 
worst. 
 Riesbeck’s volume begins and ends with chapters that articulate (chapter 1) and resolve 
(chapter 6) these ‘problems of monarchy.’ The problems’ resolutions are based on carefully 
exegesis of all relevant Aristotle texts (including from the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics) 
concerning community (or κοινωνία) in general (chapter 2), specifically political community 
(chapter 3), political or reciprocal rule (chapter 4), and the nature of citizenship and constitution 
(chapter 5). Although each individual chapter is a model of philosophical, philological, and 
historically contextualized analysis on its subject, the ‘inner’ chapters together provide the textual 
basis for Riesbeck to argue that Aristotle believes that political participation is not a necessary or 
constitutive component of human well-being and that participation in a community is compatible 
with the claim that a citizen-body is not coextensive with a community’s ruling class. Riesbeck’s 
‘test case,’ namely whether for Aristotle kingship is compatible with political community, thus 
provides the basis for a plausible solution to a perennial problem in scholarship on Aristotle’s 
Politics and a detailed analysis of the major concepts of Aristotle’s Politics in general. Put slightly 
differently: scholars trying to make sense of Aristotle’s notion of kingship will turn to Riesbeck’s 
book as the pre-eminent scholarly treatment of that concept; the same scholars (I strongly suspect) 
will hang around to see how the foundational concepts of Aristotle’s Politics cohere together. 
 Length precludes an extended critique of Riesbeck’s magisterial volume, as does my 
agreement with much of what the book argues for. We do have one point of significant 
disagreement. Riesbeck is firmly committed to the claim that Aristotle distinguishes kingship from 
tyranny and that the former is a ‘correct’ constitution whereas the latter is a ‘deviant’ one (e.g., 33, 
239-248). Indeed, an aspect of the normative problem of monarchy is just the claim that kingship 
is a just form of rule. Nonetheless, over the last two decades the historical work of scholars such 
as Kathryn Morgan (e.g., Popular Tyranny. Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece 
[Austin, 2003]), Sian Lewis (e.g., Greek Tyranny [Exeter, 2009] and Ancient Tyranny [Edinburgh, 
2006]), and Lynette Mitchell (e.g., The Heroic Rulers of Archaic and Classical Greece [London, 
2013]) has suggested that the distinction between tyrant and kingship is more complicated than the 
analytical crispness of constitution differentiation that Aristotle offers in some parts of the Politics 
(for example, Pol. 3.6). At the same time, the Aristotelian Constitution of Athens likened the rule 
of Peisistratus to a ‘golden age’ (Ath. Pol. 16.2, 7, 9) and the Politics itself suggests in several 
places that tyrants can preserve their reigns by becoming more king-like (Pol. 5.11.1314a31-40, 
1315a40-b10). Many of the passages that generate Riesbeck’s ‘conceptual problem of monarchy’ 
are instances in which the king becomes more ‘tyrannical’ (for instance, ruling regardless of the 
consent of the governed or solely in conformity with the king’s own will [Pol. 3.16.1287a1-3]). 
But if some passages in the Politics blur the line between kings and tyrants, that may be less of a 
‘conceptual problem’ and more an instance of Aristotle being faithful to his 5th and 4th century 
historical sources.  
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